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ABSTRACT. Traﬃcking in drugs is a global problem. The legal response to the
challenge of traﬃcking in drugs is found in harsh penalties usually founded in direct
imprisonment for extended periods of time. The worldwide trend towards impris-
oning drug traﬃckers, and indeed drug users, is mimicked in South Africa. This
submission examines the sentencing or penal eﬀects of the drug Nyaope, which was
included in Schedule I and II of the South African Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act
140 of 1992 (Hereinafter the Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act.), in 2014. The eﬀect of
the inclusion is that Nyaope users and traﬃckers are now punished in the same
manner as any other traﬃckers namely, through direct imprisonment. This sub-
mission argues that the inclusion of Nyaope and the resultant eﬀect on sentencing is
an example of net widening and results all too often in a one size ﬁts all (The phrase
One size ﬁts all’ literally describes commercial products tailored for suitability in all
instances. It has since extended to describing eﬀects of methods and measures upon
applications, hence its adoption in several ﬁelds interpretations including law. As a
legal term it diﬀerentiates general understanding of the application of particular
principles to speciﬁc practical application. For example, in multilateral trade, it is
used to analyse a perspective inscribing commonness in an uncommon or uncom-
petitive circumstance such as in the rationale behind the imposition of limitations on
special and diﬀerential treatment principles for developing and least developed
countries against developed countries. This article uses this phrase to argue that
although the traditionally harsh sentences ﬁt drug traﬃckers this is not always the
case, especially where perpetrators are victims of drug abuse. For literal interpre-
tation, see http://dictionary.cambridge.org/CambridgeDictionaries and http://dic
tionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/one-size-ﬁts-all. For multilateral trade legal
perspective, refer to M.M.M. Monyakane, Special and Diﬀerential Treatment under
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) with Speciﬁc Reference to the Application of
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Dissertation in partial fulﬁllment of the LLM
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degree in Mercantile Law, University of the Free State South Africa http://etd.uovs.
ac.za/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-09132006-92208/unrestricted/MonyakaneMMME.
pdf 2005,75; as well as S. Michael, One Size Fits All’ An Idea Whose Time Has
Come and Gone Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Data Engi
neering (ICDE 2005) 1084-4627, who explains this concept from a diﬀerent profes
sional perspective.) approach to the sentencing of drug users and traﬃckers. This
submission uses the previous American practice of using a grid system of sentencing
to demonstrate that the inclusion of Nyaope in the Schedules of the Drugs and Drug
Traﬃcking Act has reduced sentencing discretion in a manner not conducive with the
limitation clause. The paper argues that the South African approach at present faces
the same challenges faced by American courts under the previous grid system of
sentencing. The submission argues that the South African approach to sentencing
Nyaope users should reﬂect the principle of fairness and not use an approach which
treats all drug traﬃckers as one and the same for purposes of sentencing.
I INTRODUCTION
Worldwide, eﬀective punishment for drug traﬃckers is normally
sought from legislation prescribing long term imprisonment sen-
tences.1 South Africa mimics this trend by punishing traﬃcking in
drugs falling under Schedule I and II of the Drugs and Drug Traf-
ﬁcking Act2 to a sentence of direct imprisonment of between 5 and
25 years. Sentencing for traﬃcking in drugs is aﬀected by Section 51
of the so called Minimum Sentences Act3 and in the event that a
perpetrator of traﬃcking cannot show substantial and compelling
circumstances to justify the imposition of a lesser sentence, the sen-
tencing court is obliged to sentence a traﬃcker to 15 years impris-
onment. In essence drug traﬃckers are sentenced in terms of
legislatively imposed sentencing guidelines to anything between 15
and 25 years imprisonment unless they can show substantial and
compelling circumstances justifying a sentence reduced to 5 years
imprisonment. Although the researcher does not dispute the social
evil of drug use/abuse and traﬃcking she questions the logic of sen-
tencing speciﬁcally Nyaope users under such a strict and heavily
1 Sentences for traﬃcking in drugs range from long term imprisonment to death
penalties in some of the forefront states. See http://drugabuse.com/the-20-countries-
with-the-harshest-drug-laws-in-the-world/The 20 Countries with the Harshest Drug
Laws in the World [accessed 03/02/2015].
2 South African Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act 140 of 1992 Sections 3, 4, 5, and
17.
3 Criminal Law Amendment Act 51 of 1997. Hereinafter referred to for the sake of
convenience as the Minimum Sentences Act.
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consequent regime in light of the characteristics of Nyaope as a drug
and the proﬁle of a typical user.
II THE CRIMINALISATION OF NYAOPE: A CONTEXTUAL
SYNOPSIS
In 2013 the South African Department of Justice and Constitutional
Development4 announced its intention to formally criminalise
Nyaope. Nyaope is an inexpensive concoction,5 of substances which
has become particularly attractive to young, unemployed youths6
from disadvantaged backgrounds. There are also some indications
that Nyaope is used as a method of stress-relief amongst the youth.7
The use of Nyaope has risen steadily of late and this, in part, in-
formed the DOJ&CD’s intention to take formal measures to curb its
use through legislative intervention.
4 Hereinafter DOJ&CD.
5 While reporting on concerns advocating for the criminalisation of exchanges in
Nyaope, the British broadcaster Channel 4, indicated that, a deadly cocktail nick-
named nyaope or whoonga’ is one drug that seems to be causing most concern’ and
mentioned that Nyaope is … a mixture of third grade heroin, rat poison, cleaning
detergents, and sometimes HIV antiretroviral medication [ARVs]—crack with a
sickening twist,’ which is sold as bags of white powder and is usually added to dagga
and smoked as a joint.’ In South Africa a deadly new drug is made out of ARV’S
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/[accessed April, 2014].
Regarding the inferred criminalisation of nyaope’ in South Africa, Health 24 in its
report on the 06/01/2014 entitled, More young people using heroin, A worrying trend
is the use of heroin by younger people—in combination with other drugs, such as
cocaine and dagga, mentioned that the main ingredients of Nyaope, heroin and
dagga, are listed [under chemical names/structures/formula] as undesirable depen
dence-producing substances in the Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act, Act 140 of
1992(Drug Act) even though nyaope’ is not listed as such in Schedules I and II.
http://www.health24.com/Lifestyle/Street-drugs/News/More-young-people-using-her
oin-20140106. [accessed 28/May/2015].
6 The statistics in 2008 which has not signiﬁcantly changed is that about 26 percent
of the labour force in South Africa is unemployed. See Banerjee, A etal, Why has
unemployment risen in the New South Africa? Economics of Transition Volume
16(4) 2008, 716 and see a news report of the 26 January 2015 by John Kane-Berman
There’s no disguising SA’s youth unemployment problem http://www.bdlive.co.za/
opinion/columnists/2015/01/26/theres-no-disguising-sas-youth-unemployment-
problem [accessed 27/05/2015].
7 See N Nkosi I Sell Sex for Nyaope: Nyaope Crisis Save Our Nation’ Sowetan
(2015-02-15) 8, where a girl aged 17 and had been smoking Nyaope since the age of
13 explains that she abuses Nyaope to relieve stress. Her report is just a tip of an ice
berg to statistics of youth in a similar situation.
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The South African legislature amended the Drugs and Drug
Traﬃcking Act by inserting Nyaope ‘‘ingredients’’8 into Schedules I
and II of the Act. The intention behind this move was ostensibly to
facilitate the prosecution of Nyaope related oﬀences such as posses-
sion and abuse. Advocate Mthunzi Mhaga of the Department of
Justice and Constitutional Development South Africa, conﬁrmed
that the department’s9 aim in amending the South African Drugs and
Drug Traﬃcking Act was to expand its applicability. He clariﬁed
further that in so doing South Africa would be on par with advanced
jurisdictions such as America where the designer drug10 issue is a
substantial social challenge. In order to expand the reach of the
Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act the legislature saw ﬁt to amend the
Act using two diﬀerent approaches. The ﬁrst approach saw previ-
ously unlisted drugs that contained as an ingredient a previously
listed substance or substances included in Schedule II. The second
approach saw drugs included which mimic the ‘‘pharmacodynamics
properties—that is biochemical and physiological eﬀects on a person,
similar to the listed substances.’’11 This approach practically, meant
that ‘‘[a]ny substance similar to the listed substances in Schedule II
would therefore be included in the [amendments on] Schedule[s] I and
II, based on [their] similarit[ies] in chemical composition as well as
the[ir]eﬀect[s] on the [mental health] of a person.’’12 In addition to
these mimicking substances, ‘‘speciﬁc new substances will also be
included in Schedule II to the Drugs and Drug traﬃcking Act.’’13
Resultantly, the amendment prohibit possession and dealing in any
mixture that contains chemical substances that have the same eﬀect as
the prohibited and illegal substances.14
8 See above n 5.
9 South African Department of Justice The Law to be amended to criminalise
Nyaope’ http://www.justice.gov.za/m_statements/2013/20130227_nyaope.html [ac
cessed 28 May 2015].
10 These are designed concoctions or mixtures of prohibited drugs. See Teale P
2011; 71–88.
11 See above n.09.
12 See above n.09.
13 See above n.09.
14 See above n.09.
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The eventual amendment was not without public backlash. Collins
and Skeleton,15 amongst others, documented concerns,16 regarding
the proposed amendments to the Drugs and Drug traﬃcking Act,
especially, focusing on sentencing of perpetrators. They then raised a
concern that the proposed amendments were seeking to address a
health issue through legal means—an approach viewed a challenged
in this article and therefore seeking a speedy solution.
In reaction to public concerns, the DOJ&CD, concomitant with
the view that Nyaope addicts are criminals that unsettle the fabric of
society, conﬁrmed their intention of amending the Act and eventually
‘‘eﬀected amendments to schedules I and II of the Drugs and Drug
Traﬃcking Act, 1992’’ in order to ‘‘…address the escalating use of
new narcotic substances, such as Nyaope, which are increasingly
destroying the lives of young people.’’ The DOJ&CD conﬁrmed that
‘‘Contrary to the misperception that Nyaope cannot be prosecuted;
the new amendment will ensure that the criminal justice system is
enabled to prosecute the use and possession of drugs [-Nyaope
amongst others].’’17
From the above discussion, it is evident that Nyaope now forms
part of the group of illegal substances listed in the schedules to the
Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act. The result of this inclusion is that
courts are bound to apply Sections 3–7 and 17 of the said Act when
trying a Nyaope addict who sells Nyaope for maintaining addiction.
In addition the court will be bound to apply Section 51 of the Min-
imum Sentences Act when sentencing a Nyaope addict where appli-
cable in each particular case. Where the addict is convicted of
traﬃcking in Nyaope he or she faces between 5 years imprisonment
and 25 years imprisonment depending on the satisfaction of the
substantial and compelling circumstances requirement of the Mini-
mum Sentences Act.
It is averred that the amendment as synoptically traversed above
has cast the net too wide insofar as Nyaope is concerned. The
remainder of this submission explores the negative consequences of
the amendment insofar as sentencing is concerned. It uses the
American experience to expose the challenges of attempting to leg-
15 F. Collins and D Skeleton Nyaope classiﬁcation revives drug sentencing debate,
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/health/2014/04/07/nyaope-classiﬁcation-revives-
drug-sentencing-debate [accessed 28 May 2015].
16 South African Department of Justice The End for Nyaope! http://www.justice.
gov.za/docs/articles/201405-Nyaope.pdf [accessed 27/May/2015].
17 ibid.
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islate all drugs and drug users in a one-size-ﬁts all approach to sen-
tencing. The submission further uses the Canadian experience to
suggest an alternative approach to South Africa’s blight of high drug
use in order to mitigate the current approach in South African courts.
III THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO SENTENCING DRUG
ADDICTS AND DRUG TRAFFICKERS: A DEVELOP-
MENTAL OVERVIEW
The American approach to sentencing has evolved in two phases over
time. The ﬁrst phase was where courts depended on grids as thresh-
olds within which to sentence drug related oﬀenders. Due to chal-
lenges with this system courts jurisprudence inﬂuenced the move to
greater sentencing discretion.
3.1 The Grid Approach to Sentencing: An Overview of the Previous
Position
Previously American courts relied on a so-called grid system to sen-
tence drug infringements, such as for example, the use and dealing in
crack cocaine. As is the case with most standardised practices in a due
process system of law, the use of grids to sentence drug oﬀenders was
severely criticised on the grounds that it overturned judicial discre-
tion.18 In addition to the bench, the sentencing guidelines were crit-
icised by almost all cadres of the legal profession, who expressed
‘‘extraordinary degree of hostility….’’19 Judges went to the extent of
complaining that, they found the guidelines excessively ridged and
focused on ‘‘points’’ and not people.20
The system at that point was premised on sentencing guidelines
and not the use of judicial discretion. According to the then guide-
18 See V. L. Broderick, The Importance of Flexibility in Sentencing’ (1995)78 (4)
Journal of American Judicature 182 and consider M. Miller, Rehabilitating the
federal sentencing guidelines by drawing on seven years of experience and data, the
recommendations of scholars, and the advice of judges, the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission can create a better and more widely respected system.’ (1995)78 (4) Journal
of American Judicature Society 180. As well read As well read Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.
The Death of Discretion? Reﬂections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Harvard
Law Review Vol. 101, No. 8 (Jun., 1988), pp. 1938–1960, who reckons that the
guidelines overlook several sentencing problems and instead proposes possible sen-
tencing reforms from a jurisprudence based on judicial discretion.
19 Ibid.
20 ibid.
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lines, sentencing courts were to impose a sentence suﬃcient, but not
greater than necessary. This meant that courts had to ﬁrst take ac-
count of the nature and circumstances of the oﬀence and secondly,
the history and characteristics of the defendant. Thirdly, the sen-
tencing court was required to consider available sentencing ranges
within which they were conﬁned.
The nature and circumstances of the oﬀence concept recognised
the need for the sentence to reﬂect the seriousness of the oﬀence; to
promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the of-
fence; to aﬀord adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most eﬀective manner.
The history and characteristics of the defendant concept, on the other
hand consisted generally of the previous convictions of the oﬀender,
their severity and rate of repetition and the way the oﬀender carried
him or herself before court—in other words the entire framework on
this point was little more than evaluation of character and demeanor.
The third leg of the then approach consisted of a consideration of
available sentencing ranges within which the courts were encouraged
to sentence—i.e. the courts were to sacriﬁce their discretionary ﬂex-
ibility,21 in favor of sentencing within the legislatively prescribed
ranges.
Based on the above and in general, unless otherwise provided for,
courts imposed sentences of the kind, and within the range, referred
to in the regulations.22 The courts were permitted to deviate only if
they found a sentencing factor, whether aggravating or mitigating,
that was not considered by the United States Sentencing Commission
(Commission) when it drafted the sentencing guidelines, which war-
ranted deviation from the prescribed sentencing ranges. In deter-
mining whether a particular circumstance was adequately taken into
consideration, courts considered only the sentencing guidelines. In
the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, they imposed
appropriate sentences, satisfying requirements in the regulations,23
policy statements, and oﬃcial commentary of the Commission, to-
gether with any amendments thereto by an Act of Congress.24
21 The United States Code s 994(a)(1) of title 28.
22 The United States Code s 994(a)(4).
23 The United States Code s994 (a)(2).
24 ibid.
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In relation to cases of an oﬀence other than a petty oﬀence, in the
absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, courts considered
sentencing on the basis of analogous sentences prescribed by guide-
lines as had applied in similar oﬀences on like oﬀenders, and to
applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, together
with any amendments of speciﬁc regulations such as guidelines or
policy statements by an Act of Congress. Speciﬁc regulations how-
ever, applied when sentencing a defendant convicted of certain of-
fences such as oﬀences involving minor victims.25 In these cases
courts imposed a kind of sentence within a speciﬁc range,26 except
where a particular criterion existed to deviate.27
At the time of sentencing courts were obliged to state in open
court the reasons for the imposition of particular sentences. Where
the sentence was of the kind, and within the range, described in the
regulations28 and that range exceeded 24 months, courts were obliged
to give reasons for imposing a particular sentence within that range.
If the chosen sentence was not of the kind, or was outside of the
range, described in subsection (a)(4), the court was required to give,
speciﬁc reason for imposing a sentence diﬀerent from that provided.
Such a reason or reasons was to be stated with speciﬁcity in the
written order of judgment and commitment, except to the extent that
the court relied upon statements received in camera in accordance
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. In the event that the
court relied upon statements received in camera in accordance with
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 the court was required to
stipulate that such statements were so received and that it relied upon
the content of such statements.
Any measure that the court chose to employ ought to have been
without prejudice to the sentencing process hence why courts upon
motion by the defendant or the Government, or on their own motion,
could in their discretion employ any additional procedures that they
concluded would not unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing
process. Courts however had limited authority to impose a sentence
below a statutory minimum.
25 Under section 1201; an oﬀence under section 1591, or an oﬀence under chap-
ter 71, 109A, 110, or 117.
26 The United States Code s 994(a)(4).
27 ibid.
28 ibid.
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Where courts did not order restitution, or order partial restitution,
they had to include in their statements reasons for such decision.29
Courts were mandated to provide a transcription or other appro-
priate public record of the courts statements of reasons, together with
orders of judgment and commitment to the probation system and the
Commission.30 If a sentence included a term of imprisonment they
had to submit their reports to the Bureau of Prisons.31 Before taking
a decision to impose an order of notice, courts were obliged to follow
strict pre-sentence procedure for ‘‘an order of notice.’’32 In accor-
dance with Section 3555 courts were bound to give notice about their
intention to the defendant and the Government.
Upon motion of the Government, the sentencing court had the
authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as
a minimum sentence so as to reﬂect a defendant’s substantial assis-
tance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who had
committed an oﬀence. Such sentence was imposed in accordance with
the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Commission pur-
suant to Section 994 of title 28, United States Code.
The applicability of statutory minimum sentence was limited to
certain cases. It did not apply in certain categories of the oﬀences
described by the law. Despite any other provision of law, in some
cases to certain oﬀences33 courts had no discretion but to impose a
sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Commission
under Section 994 of title 2834 without regard to any statutory min-
imum sentence.
However, this limitation could be averted in exceptional cases such
as where courts found at sentencing, factors relevant to the personal
circumstances such as the criminal history35 of the accused and the
extent of participation36 of the accused, as was previously discussed.




33 Under Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841, 844, 846) 401, 404, or 406 and
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 960, 963) section 1010 or
1013.
34 The sentencing guidelines section 994 of title 28.
35 As provided in the sentencing guidelines read with the Controlled Substances
Act.
36 Controlled Substances Act sec 408.
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The American approach to sentencing drug addicts and traﬃckers,
based on the above discussed previous position, caused much con-
sternation at all levels of the justice system. This is discussed below in
the context of the introduction of a sentencing discretion for these
types of oﬀences in the United States of America.
3.2 The American Debates on the Introduction of Sentencing Discre-
tion for Drug Traﬃcking Cases
Hereunder the researcher using crack-cocaine as an object of debate
to demonstrate the diﬃculty of determining an eﬀective sentence for
those addicted to dependence producing substances when sentencing
discretion is restricted.
The sentencing jurisprudence on crack cocaine cases in the United
States of America was previously characterised by two approaches.
While there was an inclination to stick to the guidelines and jury
contribution to sentencing (as discussed in 3.1 above) there was also a
move towards discretionary sentencing. The case that led the evolu-
tion of sentencing in respect of minor ‘‘drug traﬃcking’’ oﬀences is
the decision in United States v Booker.37
This case came after ﬁve years since the decision in Apprendi v New
Jersey.38In Apprendi, the defendant was convicted of possession of a
ﬁrearm for an unlawful purpose. The judge found, in addition, that
the crime was committed with the intent of intimidating an African
American family based solely on their race, and thus applied the state
hate crime sentence enhancement. Whereas the defendant would have
faced 5 to 10 years based on the weapons oﬀence, the judge imposed
a sentence of 12 years as a result of the sentencing enhancement for
the racial motivation of the crime.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Apprendi’s sentence while it held
that ‘‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that in-
creases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.’’39 Failing to meet this standard was a violation of the
protections of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
37 United States v. Booker, 543 US 220 (2005) Hereinafter referred to as Booker.
See, as well, RS King and M Mauer Sentencing with Discretion: Crack Cocaine
Sentencing After Booker January 2006. http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/
Documents/Publications. [date accessed 2/February/2014].
38 Apprendi v New Jersey 530 U.S. 466(2000).
39 ibid.
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tion. Whereas the jury had convicted Apprendi for the weapons of-
fence, it was the judge, based on testimony heard during a later
hearing, who decided to apply the hate crime enhancement. The trial
judge’s ﬁnding of a racial motivation to the crime by a preponderance
of the evidence violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment protection
to have evidence impacting on sentence proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. The outcome of this decision greatly altered the landscape by
which criminal sentences were crafted. The requirement that all
sentence enhancements be proven beyond a reasonable doubt would
reverberate through future sentencing jurisprudence. Apprendi con-
tinued a thread of case law that had emerged in the cases of Jones v
United States40 and Almendarez-Torres v United States.41 The central
question was what factors and circumstances of the oﬀence and the
oﬀender could be considered in the determination of a sentence and
what was the appropriate burden of proof. Forth ﬂowing form the
above inquiries the role of the judge and the jury in sentencing
deliberations arose as a central focus for cases that followed.
Two years later, from the time of Apprendi decision, the Supreme
Court extended the Sixth Amendment protections carved out in
Apprendi to cases in which the defendants faced capital punishment.42
In 2004, the Supreme Court continued to expand the reach of Ap-
prendi in the case of Blakely.
In Blakely, the defendant faced a ‘‘standard range’’ of 49 to
53 months for kidnapping, but the judge added an additional
37 months to the sentence. In Blakely the court struck down a pro-
vision of the Washington State sentencing guidelines system as
unconstitutional because it permitted a judge, when deciding whether
to enhance a sentence above the guideline range, to consider factors
that had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in front of a
jury. The ruling in Booker conﬁrmed that the holding in Blakely was
applicable to the Federal Guidelines. In the remedial opinion, the
court severed two provisions from the Sentencing Reform Act,43
while keeping intact the rest of the Guidelines system. However, in
doing so, the Guidelines, formerly mandatory, were rendered advi-
sory. ‘‘This dramatically changed the sentencing landscape and raised
40 Jones v United States 526 U.S. 227,230 (1999).
41 Almendarez-Torres v United States 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
42 For example, Ring v. Arizona 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
43 Of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.
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one of the federal system’s most contentious characteristics to centre-
stage.’’44
In light of this decision, Booker tested the constitutionality of
sentencing procedures in the federal court system. Prior to Booker,
federal sentencing procedures subject to the legislation adopted by
Congress in 1986 and 1988, had a penalty structure for crack cocaine
which was far harsher than penalty structure for powder cocaine.
Under the federal guidelines, a conviction for the sale of 500 grams of
powder cocaine resulted in a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence,
while the same penalty was triggered for sale or possession of only 5
grams of crack cocaine. Thus, the federal sentencing system applied a
100-to-1-quantity disparity when dealing with crack and powder
cocaine, which are in essence same drug. This disparity had devas-
tating consequences for various sectors of society, but was particu-
larly evident in the African American community and resulted in
severe sentences that many identiﬁed as unjust.45
In the 20 years since the passage of this legislation, there were
numerous calls for reform from advocates, policymakers and the
Commission, but the 100-to-1 sentencing disparity between powder
and crack cocaine still remained controlling law.46
In Booker, the court’s decision permitted judges to exercise greater
discretion only in two types of cases. The ﬁrst were cases where a
mandatory sentence did not apply and where courts considered
enhancements beyond the baseline sentence. This category encom-
passed a vast majority of cases where a mandatory sentence does
apply. However, Federal judges continued to impose stiﬀ prison
sentences despite deviations from the guidelines. While these repre-
sented a very modest proportion of crack cocaine sentences, the exact
position remains unclear because in the vast majority of sentencing
cases in these courts no written decisions are given. What can be
discerned from analyses of the work of these courts is that similar
dynamics applied to signiﬁcant numbers of additional crack cocaine
44 http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/Publications. [date accessed
2/February/2014].
45 ibid.
46 See above n. 44 and read Frank O. Bowman, III The Failure of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis Columbia Law Review Vol. 105, No. 4
(May, 2005), pp. 1315-1350, who discusses the problems brought to bear by the
sentencing guidelines by drawing on examples from a stretched period of time within
which the guidelines applied.
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cases. As a trend, most of the crack cocaine defendants received
substantial prison terms, averaging nearly 11 years.
This implied an obvious indication of resistance and the diﬃculty
courts experienced in moving from inﬂexible limitations on their
discretion. Judicial consideration of sentencing factors then required
by the Supreme Court’s Booker decision resulted in sentences below
the Guideline range. Using Booker Federal judges employed per-
mitted discretion in assessing individual case characteristics and, in
selected cases, they used Booker to calibrate sentences that more
appropriately met the statutory goals of sentencing, including ﬁrst the
relative weight of guideline, secondly, goals of sentencing and thirdly,
individual circumstances.47 With the granted court abilities, the
Booker impact on crack cocaine sentencing proved signiﬁcant. As a
result, a volume of cases that were decided in line with its ﬁnding
increased, even though there were some challenges in determining
exact statistics due to the pervasiveness of mandatory minimum
sentences.48 The emergence of Booker and the cases that followed it
marked the change in the rationale of sentencing in the sense that the
inﬂexibilities imposed by legislating judicial discretion were addressed
to form a better sentencing system. It was obvious, as King and
Mauer49 exposed, that post- Booker jurisprudence proved that, the
adoption of mandatory provisions such as sentencing guidelines was
unnecessary. What is clear in this stance is that when ‘‘…judges are
given ﬂexibility to consider the full merits of each case, they are likely
to impose stiﬀ penalties for serious oﬀences but will still have ability
to [diﬀerentiate] these from cases in which the defendant is less cul-
pable or less of a threat to public safety [, like it has to be in Crack
Cocaine Penalty Structure.]’’50 A few years after Booker a change in
sentiment occurred and courts turned again to strictly adhering to the
sentencing guidelines. In the United States of America v Mario
Claiborne,51 a Federal court matter, Claiborne pleaded guilty to two
counts of possessing and distributing cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C.§§ 841(a)(1) and 844(a). He was convicted of possession of 5.03
grams of crack cocaine and was subject to a ﬁve-year mandatory
47 ibid.
48 In ﬁscal year 2003, federal courts sentenced 5,462 persons for crack cocaine
oﬀences. Three-fourths of this group were sentenced to mandatory prison terms of
either ﬁve years (28.9% or ten years (47.5%).’ See, above n 46.
49 See, above n 44.
50 See, above n 44.
51 United States of America v Mario Claiborne 439 F. 3d 479(2006).
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minimum sentence for the oﬀence. However, in the light of Clai-
borne’s lack of a criminal history and the absence of violence asso-
ciated with his oﬀence, the district judge applied a safety-valve
exception from the Mandatory minimum and imposed a sentence of
15 months. The Government appealed arguing that 15 months is an
unreasonable downward variance from the guiding range. The
Government challenged the sentence reached on the basis of
the reasoning in Booker; the plaintiﬀ insisted that the application of
the regulations would reach a reasonable decision. Diﬀerently to the
Booker decision, the Government was against the trial court on the
basis that it passed a sentence lesser than prescribed in the regula-
tions. The United States Court of Appeal for the Eighth Circuit held
in favour of the Government. Similarly, the decision in Apprendi-
Ring-Blakely, which was challenged by Booker,52 was followed in
January 2007. On 22 January 2007, the United States Supreme Court
dealt with Cunningham v California53 another example in a line of
jurisprudence extending back to the 2000 ruling in Apprendi. In this
case United States Supreme Court struck down California’s Deter-
mine Sentencing Law (DSL) system. This court, ruled that a sentence
cannot be increased based on aggravating factors that have not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt before a jury. California’s DSL is
couched along Booker federal sentencing precedent. California’s DSL
prescribed upper term sentences to be imposed in cases with aggra-
vating circumstances excluding cases pertaining to crimes with ele-
ments requiring jury determination or where accused tendered a plea
of guilt. This is due to the fact that procedurally, the judge is tasked
to determine the aggravating circumstances. Applying Blakely, this
circumstance would therefore relate to the middle term prescribed in
California’s statutes as the relevant statutory maximum, and not the
upper term. As Apprendi’s interpretation relates, statutory maximum
is the maximum sentence a court may impose basing itself on the
basis of the facts reﬂected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant. Based on the principle laid in Apprendi’s case, namely that,
‘‘unless in the cases where there are previous convictions, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.’’54 the DSL read with Booker task the ﬁnding of
aggravating circumstances to the judge and not to the jury. In this
52 United States v. Booker, 543 US 220 (2005).
53 Cunningham v California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
54 Apprendi v New Jersey 530 U.S. 466(2000).
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way, the ﬁnding of aggravating circumstances would be on the bal-
ance of probabilities and not beyond a reasonable doubt as it would
be if the jury was engaged.55 This in eﬀect changed the principle laid
in Apprendi.The case of People v Black56 added another change on
Apprendi’ s rules, while appreciating that prima facie there is clash
between the California’s system and the Apprendi rule. It also rein-
terpreted this rule in that it took it to be excepting only cases with
previous convictions. While doing so it exonerated the DSL from
examination. In eﬀect, the DSL ‘‘simply authorise[s] a sentencing
court to engage in the type of fact-ﬁnding that traditionally had been
incident to the judge’s selection of an appropriate sentence within a
statutorily prescribed sentencing range,’’57as concluded, in Black.
Hence forth, ‘‘the upper term [was] the statutory maximum’’ and a
trial court’s imposition of an upper term sentence [did] not violate a
defendant’s right to a jury trial under the principles set forth in Ap-
prendi, Blakely and Booker.In essence the rationale in the Black
judgement is to aﬀord the sentencing judge the discretion to decide
while considering rules and statutes, whether the facts of the case and
the history of the defendant justify the higher sentence, and not to
diminish the traditional power of the jury. Having traversed the
American sentencing perspective on sentencing the part hereunder
considers the South African general approach to sentencing before
examining sentencing in terms of drug oﬀences speciﬁcally.
IV THE RATIONALE FOR SENTENCING IN SOUTH
AFRICA
The rationale of South African law sentencing procedure is to
maintain a just and fair punishment. This procedure therefore, pro-
hibits unfair sentencing practices and prefers punishment that deters
with a degree of mercy. Ultimately, the goal is to rehabilitate
oﬀenders and not condemn them. In order to attain the envisaged fair
and balanced sentencing it is important that sentences are metered
out with consistency. In particular, the criminal justice system prefers
this approach because it maintains the dignity of courts.58
55 ibid.
56 People v Black 161 P.3d 1130 (2007), hereinafter Black.
57 ibid.
58 S.S. Terblanche, The Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2nd edn (Butterworths:
Durban, 2007)151.
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In line with a due process approach, sentencing courts consider
constitutional provisions as paramount.59 Homage to constitutional
principles demonstrates respect for the supremacy of the law ema-
nating from the basic good or the grundnorm. The Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 199660 regulates the power of state to
sentence or punish oﬀenders and deﬁnes the extent and limits of the
exercise of such power by courts.61 In South Africa all laws and
practices have to abide by the provisions of the written Constitution.
In this regard, Section 2 of the Constitution states, the Constitution is
the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it
is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulﬁlled.
Most importantly, the Constitution has the Bill of Rights in
Chapter 2. Section 12(1)(e) is pertinent to sentencing. It entitles
everyone to the right to freedom and security, which includes the
right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading
manner. Relevant to this right are other basic rights including the
right to life, to dignity and to equality before the law. 62 The umbrella
provision of the Constitution pertaining to criminal trials is the right
to a fair trial. Fairness in this case relates to procedural fairness,
which implies that at the minimum there should be compliance with
the rules of natural justice. Natural justice encompasses the principles
of audi alteram partem and nemo judex in proprea causasua. It
establishes a general duty to act fairly, in a procedural sense, in
accordance with the rule of law in South Africa where individual
rights are aﬀected.63 As Terblanche observed, ‘‘the exact meaning of
a fair trial’ is not ﬁxed, the test of what is fair and what is not
depends on all the circumstances of every case, and is determined
objectively.’’64
59 This is the means to satisfy fair trial demands in section 35 of the Constitution
read with section 12 of the Constitution.
60 Hereinafter the Constitution.
61 D. Van Zyl Sentencing and Punishment’ in Chaskalson A, Kentridge J, Klaaren
J, Marcus G, Spitz D and Woolman S (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa
(Juta: South Africa1999) vol 2 28-1.
62 State v Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) 302. Also see section 35(1) of the
Constitution.
63 L.M. Du Plessis and H. Corder, Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill
of Rights (Juta: South Africa, 1994) 169.
64 See Terblanche above n.58 at 3. Also see Shabalala v Attorney General of
Transvaal 1995 (2) SACR 761 (CC) para 51.
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4.1 South African Sentencing Law: A Synoptic Overview
The South African courts utilise a myriad of principles concerning
sentencing and these are found in common law, statutes, case law and
academic writings. These principles are interpreted in the context of
relevant South African Constitution provisions. In particular, Sec-
tion 12(1) and Section 35. These sections have to be read with the
limitation clause in Section 36. In pursuit of a balanced fair and just
sentence presiding oﬃcers in South African courts consider standard
principles of sentencing. This approach mandates consideration of
factors of punishment as stipulated in Zinn65 and Rabie.66
Generally, speciﬁc sentencing principles emanate from judicial
interpretation of relevant provisions. This interpretation is basically
the discretion by the judicial oﬃcer having considered the evidence
tabled before court.67 As Terblanche postulates,
Imposing sentence is an action, because it requires the court to purposefully
work at ﬁnding the most appropriate sentence, and ensure that the sentence is
imposed clearly and unambiguously, and will be executed, to the extent which
this is legally within the courts powers. Sentencing should also be preceded by
an active determination of all facts and factors which may have a bearing on
what the most appropriate sentence will be.68
In Sv Toms and S v Bruce69 Smalberger JA emphasised the impor-
tance of judicial discretion in sentencing. In consonance with Smal-
berger’s view, Terblanche justiﬁes discretion in that it helps the
sentencing court to individualise the accused before court.70 In this
way, ‘‘[t]he court has to exercise its sentence discretion to choose the
most appropriate sentence from the possible alternatives. The exer-
cise of the sentence discretion does not take place in a vacuum. As a
guide to its exercise, South African law on sentencing has developed a
number of general principles which should be applied in every
case.’’71 These guiding principles to this eﬀect mandated that sen-
65 S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537.
66 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A).
67 There are two scenarios to this position; through evidence lead during trial
(fairness) and through execution of section 112(3) of the CPA.
68 See Terblanche above n.58 at 3.
69 S v Toms and S v Bruce 1990 2 SA 802 (A) 806H-I.
70 See Terblanche above n.58 at 150.
71 See Terblanche above n.58 at 153.
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tencing courts impose appropriate sentences on the basis of all cir-
cumstances of each particular case.
The sentence should be neither too light nor too severe. The
sentence imposed should be a reﬂection of the severity of crime while
giving consideration to mitigating and aggravating factors sur-
rounding the person who has oﬀended. Put diﬀerently ‘‘…the sen-
tence should reﬂect the blameworthiness of the oﬀender, or be in
proportion to what is deserved by the oﬀender.’’72 Aware of the
mentioned nature of sentence, courts are guided by their observance
of two main factors in sentencing, the crime and the oﬀender as per
the triad in Zinn.73 Following these two main factors is a consider-
ation of society in whose interests the courts have to be seen to be
acting by deterring the would be criminals; preventing the repetition
of such criminal behaviours in future while mitigating for rehabili-
tation of the oﬀender as well as avenging the aggrieved through a
retributive punishment.
Terblanche74 has categorised and therefore prioritised these sec-
ondary factors, where he sees deterrence as the ‘‘most important of
the purposes of punishment,’’75 because it has a dual eﬀect, namely,
to ‘‘deter the oﬀender from reoﬀending, and to deter the other would-
be oﬀenders.’’76 He considers rehabilitation an unimportant factor
and therefore optional in the sense that courts ought to consider it
when dealing with less serious crimes as opposed to cases of very
serious crime, where long terms of imprisonments are appropriate.
This submission argues that these instances include those where
legislation prescribes heavy sentences such as in case of the so-called
Minimum Sentences Act and the Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act.
By Terblanche’s reasoning prevention, although a factor for
consideration in sentencing, plays a separate purpose for punishment
and is rarely discussed. Regarding retribution, the courts would be
led by the sense of society’s abhorrence with particular crime and its
value in sentencing depends on the facts of the case and ‘‘Thus, if the
72 ibid.
73 In S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537 Rumpﬀ J A held the triad of crime to be consisting of
three factors, the oﬀender, the interests of society, and the credibility of the presiding
oﬃcer.
74 See Terblanche above n.58 at151.
75 ibid.
76 ibid.
’MAMPOLOKENG ’MATHUSO MARY-ELIZABETH MONYAKANE244
crime is viewed by society with abhorrence, the sentence should also
reﬂect this abhorrence.’’77
As inferred above, retribution avenges and therefore it relates to
the requirement that the punishment should ﬁt the crime, or that
there should be a proportional relationship between the punishment
and the crime. In mitigating for rehabilitation, the court would apply
mercy which is ‘‘contained within a balanced and humane approach
when considering the appropriate punishment. This appropriate
punishment is not reduced in order to provide for mercy. There is
[therefore] no room for a vindictive and vengeful attitude from the
sentencing oﬃcer.’’78
As Terblanche underscores only a small number of factors play a
major role in sentencing, namely, ‘‘the seriousness of the crime,
whether the oﬀender is a young or ﬁrst oﬀender, and (in isolated
instances) whether the oﬀender acted with limited criminal respon-
sibility.’’79 By adhering to these principles, the court is expected to
pass a ‘‘proper’’ sentence while giving full reasons for its conviction,
which forms the basis of the sentence it ultimately passes.80 What
exactly constitutes a ‘‘proper sentence’’ varies from case to case and
probably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.81 The court, however,
ought to consider the crime, the criminal and the interests of society
to ﬁnd the sentence, which objectively best balances these elements
with retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation.
This delicate balance requires ﬂexibility which is ordinarily avail-
able through judicial discretion at sentencing. Hence it is trite to
argue that, public policy demands be satisﬁed because they are the
basis of the general criminal justice perspective which inﬂuences the
South African perspective of humane approach in sentencing. This
means that in sentencing, constitutional demands are paramount. It is
therefore apparent that sentencing within constitutional demands
requires ﬂexibility on the side of the sentencing oﬃcer and does not
survive in compartmentalised and restricted environments. With
these well set principles, any attempt by the legislature to thwart or
77 ibid.
78 See Terblanche above n.58 at 153–154.
79 See Terblanche above n.58 at 150.
80 See section 146 (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; S v Immelm
1978(3) SA 726(A) 729 B: R v Van der Walt 1952 (4) SA 382(A) 383 D; R v Henbsch
1953 (2) SA; S v Masuku. 1985 (3) SA 908 (A) 912 F.
81 Jurisdiction of a court determines the extent and nature of the sentences which it
may impose.
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limit the required ﬂexibility of judicial discretion would limit the
courts ability to execute its constitutional mandate to ensure the
sentences it delivers are fair and balanced. It is submitted that this
position is especially evident in the current statutorily inferred sen-
tencing of drug traﬃckers who also abuse Nyaope in terms of the
anti-traﬃcking law.
4.2 Interpreting the South African Anti-drug Traﬃcking Law: The So-
Called Minimum Sentences Act read with the Drugs and Drug
Traﬃcking Act
Contrary to the long standing sentencing principles canvassed above,
it is apparent that judicial discretion has been restricted by the leg-
islature in some instances. For example, in 1997 at the behest of
replacing the death sentence, parliament passed the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997.82 This legislation sought to change the
sentencing regime of South Africa with its prescribed minimum
sentences for certain crimes which the legislature considered serious
enough to warrant imprisonment for certain prescribed periods of
time.83 According to the Act, unless the accused satisﬁes the sen-
tencing court that a minimum sentence should not apply by proving
substantial and compelling circumstances, the court cannot justify the
imposition of a lesser sentence.84It is however trite to submit that the
demand to prove substantial and compelling circumstances is ironical
because it is borne of evidentiary burden and not of clear and direct
onus on the accused or the prosecution. In these circumstances the
determination of substantial and compelling circumstances remains
solely the discretion of the court, even though its hands remain tied
by the requirement of the Minimum Sentences Act.
The eﬀect of this requirement is that sentences, for some crimes,
must be passed under the legislated guidance for certain serious of-
fences unless the court can provide reasons for slight deviation from
the prescribed sentence. In this way the Minimum Sentences Act
limits the courts discretion in sentencing the perpetrators of serious
crimes. This results; it is submitted, in some situations at least, to
imbalanced sentences which have no regard for speciﬁc circumstances
of particular cases before courts. For the purposes of this submission,
82 See __________ Sentencing in South Africa, Conference Report 1 (Open Society
Foundation for South Africa, 2006)28.
83 Above n.58.
84 Ibid.
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for example, oﬀences in terms of Schedules I and II of the Drugs and
Drug Traﬃcking Act. The Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act when
read with the Act on Minimum Sentences has the eﬀect of impris-
oning a Nyaope user and traﬃcker to a sentence of direct impris-
onment between 15 and 25 years. In eﬀect the Acts read together
create a sentencing grid for Nyaope users and traﬃckers which does
not provide any scope for the court to consider the impact of
addiction on the eventual traﬃcking. In addition these Acts permit
courts to sentence to imprisonment those with serious health concern,
as opposed to oﬀering an alternative.
The sentencing grid would be applicable to the possessor and
traﬃcker of dangerous drugs in contravention of Sections 4(b) and
5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act. In this regard the abu-
sers and addicts who are also dealing in drugs will ﬁnd themselves in
dragnet.
V SENTENCING UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN ANTI-
DRUG TRAFFICKING LAWS
The sentencing clauses found in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 17 of the Drugs
and Drug Traﬃcking Act85 read with Section 51 of the Minimum
Sentences Act86 prescribe mandatory sentences of imprisonment for
all drug traﬃckers, depending on the gravity of oﬀender’s involve-
ment… These periods range from at least a minimum period of
5 years imprisonment to a maximum of 25 years imprisonment. The
Minimum Sentences Act prescribes imprisonment sentences for per-
sons convicted of possession of drugs referred to in the Schedules I
and II of Drugs and Drug traﬃcking Act.
As these provisions do not diﬀerentiate addicts from pure oﬀend-
ers, they pose a problem for purposes of sentencing addicted drug
traﬃckers. In terms of the Minimum Sentences Act, Schedule II of-
fences are subjected to very harsh qualiﬁcations.87 For example,
Section 51(3)(a) requires that substantial and compelling circum-
stances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than any
sentence prescribed. In this way the Act maintains the strict applica-
tion of the requirement of imprisonment for a certain period of time.
85 The South African Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act no 140 of 1992.
86 The South African Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997(the Minimum
Sentences Act).
87 S v Legoa 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA) para 13.
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S v Dzukuda & Others88 and S v Malgas89 shed some light on what
constitutes substantial and compelling circumstances. In terms of the
dictum in these cases Section 51 extends to limiting judicial discretion
as far as speciﬁc crimes are concerned. Thus for the exercise of limited
discretion there should not be ‘‘weighty justiﬁcation’’ for the impo-
sition of prescribed sentences and, in addition, there ought to be
‘‘truly convincing’’ reasons why the courts would respond diﬀerently
where a statutorily listed crime which elicits a severe, standardised
and consistent response from the courts. Such reasons ought not to
be based on light and or ﬂimsy motives.
Regardless of the legislature’s appreciation that court may invoke
lesser sentences in certain instances, by making imprisonment the
only option for the scheduled oﬀences, Section 51(5)) prohibits a
court imposing a sentence in terms of Section 51 from invoking its
general powers of suspension of part of a sentence in terms of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Because under these require-
ments, the emphasis has shifted to the objective gravity of the type of
crime and the need for eﬀective sanctions against it, rather than a
considerate reﬂection on mitigating circumstances, a shift has oc-
curred in which personal circumstances are given lesser consideration.
It is submitted that in the light of the fact that there is no legislation
speciﬁcally concerned with drug traﬃckers who abuse drugs, the fact
that an abuser stands charged in terms of Schedules I and II oﬀence,
mitigates against his personal circumstances. Thus the fact that he
has health-related issues would not ﬁt the composite yardstick of
substantial and compelling circumstances.
The sentencing of Nyaope sellers and abusers in terms of these
provisions render absurd the positive attempts concerning the erad-
ication of drug traﬃcking crimes. The introduction of the Minimum
Sentences Act marked a radical change in the South African sen-
tencing regime. It was hailed in some quarters as a milestone towards
eradicating inconsistency and unfairness in the sentencing system,
where similar crimes were perpetrated. Its introduction however
brought up disfavour amongst the judiciary where courts in some
cases90 considered it a legislative encroachment on discretionary
powers.91 The question whether Section 51 is constitutionally valid
88 S v Dzukuza;S v Thilo 2000 2 SACR 443(CC).
89 S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA).
90 Prince and another v State 2003 (4) All SA (SCA) 51.
91 S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC).
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was raised in the Constitutional Court in State v Dodo, in April 2001.
The Constitutional Court declined to conﬁrm an order of invalidity
made in the High Court. That court had held, inter alia, that the
section constituted an invasion of the domain of the judiciary by the
legislature, in breach of the constitutional separation of powers
embedded in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court disagreed,
holding that the Constitution did not provide for an absolute sepa-
ration between legislative, executive and judicial powers and that ‘‘….
it is pre-eminently the function of the Legislature to determine what
conduct should be criminalised and punished.’’92
Coupled with the ﬂexibility the Act on Minimum Sentences oﬀers
to the Minister of Justice, to amend the schedules via announcements
in the government gazette from time to time, its eﬀect is unpre-
dictable. It is submitted that this marks a legislative failure to con-
template possible challenges that restrictive sentencing regime may
pose on courts, while the Minister holds a ﬂexible mandate to fulﬁl
statutory demands. The listing of Nyaope amongst Schedules I and II
oﬀences of the Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act is exemplary of the
ensued risks on sentencing under a restricted sentencing regime. This
new development has brought about unparalleled damage to the
addict and community calling for a diﬀerent sentencing perspective
from the one that the two Acts prescribe.93
Unlike the constitutional approach that emphasises judicial dis-
cretion the sentencing measures in the South African drug prevention
regime do not have proactive eﬀects to speciﬁc classes of oﬀenders
such as Nyaope abusers who are also drug addicts. To avoid a
blanket approach to sentencing, customarily courts are supposed to
act proactively when sentencing and consider all aspects of both
mitigation and aggravating circumstances and give such an equal
bearing. This happens when no sentencing grids are put in place
unlike the ‘‘one size ﬁts all’’ approach currently entrenched in the
Drugs and Drug Traﬃcking Act read with the so called Minimum
Sentences Act. Perhaps it is time that the South African legislature
turned to other jurisdictions to seek possible solutions to the scourge
of drug use and abuse in South Africa.
92 ibid.
93 The problems mounting Nyaope traﬃcking and addiction in South African
township cannot be completely dealt with under the criminal justice system. This is
more a health issue problem than a criminal issue. See the implication in N. Nkosi, I
Sell Sex for Nyaope: Nyaope Crisis Save Our Nation’ Sowetan (South Africa, 2015-
02-15) 8.
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VI LEARNING FROM A CONSTRUCTIVE CANADIAN
SENTENCING APPROACH TO SENTENCING DRUG
ABUSERS WHO ALSO TRAFFIC IN DRUGS
Recently, when deciding a British Columbia94 matter, Galati J was
faced with a predicament in a matter concerning the sentencing of a
‘‘recurrent drug pusher’’ and ‘‘abuser of crack cocaine.’’ Canadian
courts are bound to a mandatory minimum sentence of 1 year
imprisonment for a person convicted of drug traﬃcking under Sec-
tion 5(1) or possession for purposes of traﬃcking under Section 5(2)
of the CDSA,95 where the oﬀender was previously convicted of a
designated substance oﬀence, or had served a term of imprisonment
for a designated substance oﬀence in the previous 10 years.96
Unlike the American approach that South Africa is seeking to
emulate, Galati J opted for a constructive approach as the accused
who defaulted in criminal behaviour after abusing drugs could not ﬁt
within the circumstantially and procedurally demarcated statutory
rebates97 constituting alternatives to mandatory minimum sen-
tences.98
At the behest of the defence’s challenge on the constitutionality99
of the minimum sentence clause, the court found against the Public
Prosecution Services of Canada (the Crown). The Crown’s argument
as far as the sentencing clause is concerned was that, the concurrent
sentences implied by the CDSA, in the circumstances of the case
before court, were appropriate and not infringing against individual
rights and that even if they do, such infringement is justiﬁed as a
reasonable limit prescribed by law.100 The Crown sought the accused
to be imprisoned for 2 years less 1 day. This was contrary to the
sentence of three to 4 months imprisonment proposed by the defence.
94 On the 24 January 2014 before the Provincial Court in R v Lloyd, 2014 BCPC
8(CanLII).
95 In terms of Section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
(CDSA). See as well, R v Lloyd 2014 BCPC 8(CanLII) at para 3.
96 This mandatory minimum sentence had operated since the 2012 Bill C-10, Safe
Streets and Communities Act SC, 2012,c1.
97 R v Lloyd 2014 BCPC 8(CanLII) at para 55.
98 SC 1996,c19.
99 Defence argued, in terms of s.24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms(the
Charter’) Section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) is unconstitutional and of no force because it violates
ss 7, 9 and 12 of the Charter.
100 Referring to Chapter 1 of the Charter.
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The Crown had presented cases supporting its argument to the
court. The court lamented the approach followed by courts in those
decisions in that those courts, in dealing with cases with circum-
stances similar to the conditions of the case before court focused on
‘‘denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives.’’ 101
These courts, the court observed were focused on three aspects,
namely, ‘‘the serious adverse health consequences [,] personal misery
associated with the ensued oﬀences [and] the resultant social and
economic consequences to society.’’102
The judge saw it necessary that each accused should be considered
an individual with unique circumstances and in order to do that, it
devised an approach, where the court ﬁrst, inquired whether it would
not be ‘‘grossly disproportional’’ to punish the accused in terms of
the restricted sentencing law and secondly, the court objectively
measured if in cases of similar circumstances there would be potential
for a grossly disproportionate sentence. The court’s decision was
informed by the following factors: the gravity of the oﬀence, the
circumstances of the oﬀender and case, the actual eﬀect of the pun-
ishment on the individual, principles of sentencing, the existence of
valid alternatives to the mandatory minimum, and a comparative
analysis of punishments for other crimes.103
The court then using the test of an addict from the same locality as
the accused, considered the position of the accused as an addict in
possession of a small amount of a Schedule 1 substance intending to
share it with a spouse or a friend who would then be caught under the
same mandatory minimum sentence as a drug traﬃcker. The judge
deemed applying a mandatory minimum sentence of 1 year impris-
onment in this scenario as grossly disproportionate because such a
sentence went well beyond what is justiﬁed by the legitimate ‘‘peno-
logical goals’’ and ‘‘sentencing principles’’ of the Canadian drugs
traﬃcking laws.
As a Canadian like other Canadians would feel, the sentence was
unsettling to the Court and was abhorrent as well as intolerable.
Consequently, the court found that the mandatory minimum sen-
tence of imprisonment for 1 year required by s. 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the
CDSA constituted cruel and unusual punishment in the circum-
101 R v Lloyd 2014 BCPC 8(CanLII) at para 29.
102 ibid.
103 R v Lloyd 2014 BCPC 8(CanLII) at para 78.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DRUGS AND DRUG TRAFFICKING ACT 140 OF 1992 251
stances of the accused.104 Galati was of the same view as argued
earlier that in the case the South African anti-drug traﬃcking laws,
seeking to enforce mandatory minimum sentences provisions on ad-
dicts who are caught traﬃcking is to ‘‘cast too wide of a net to be
constitutional, and [is] inconsistent with the objective of combating
drug traﬃcking and escalation in drug related crime.’’105
VII CONCLUSION
As the mandated imprisonment of drug abuser oﬀenders serves no
long term purpose if disproportional to the rationale of punishment,
it remains a question as to why punish the already defeated and sickly
person as if he is healthy? I would suggest that South Africa resorts to
remedial measures. Taking the Canadian case experience, South
Africa has to have vigilant and caring legal practitioners. Like the
Canadian practitioner who asked the court to appreciate the negative
trend in Canadian jurisprudence. In the light of the restriction of the
drug traﬃcking control legislation, I am conﬁdent that the depiction
in the concerned Canadian jurisprudence is exemplary of the current
sentencing trend in South Africa. Such a colossal jurisprudence, al-
though just a tip of an ice berg to what really happens in the sen-
tencing of recalcitrant drug addicts who push drugs, gives a picture
that courts are inclined to wrong approaches especially where pre-
cautions are lacking like our South African situation.
This jurisprudence shows that once courts encounter minimum
sentences clauses, they incline to turn blind eyes on the impact of the
sentence. They consider minimum sentences binding and impose
them on the recalcitrant standing at the mercy of courts’ recognition
of their fragile situation. Instead of the courts crafting sentences that
would lead to the rehabilitation of the drug addicts and therefore help
wean them oﬀ drugs to cut oﬀ the chain of criminal behaviour,
maintained for addiction at the disposal of minimum sentences,
courts condemn the sick criminals to imprisonment as implied in the
minimum sentences clause. While overlooking the immediate needs of
the accused before court, courts turn to focus solely on third un-
known potential victims. This approach suﬃces to be named ‘‘courts
potential third party victim syndrome approach,’’ in the light of its
nature of producing very unreasonable results leading to the neglect
104 R v Lloyd 2014 BCPC 8(CanLII), at para 54.
105 ibid.
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of the actual problem that courts must address. Closely scrutinised,
this approach fuels drug addiction and contributes to the high
statistics in drug related crimes. This calls for a swift law to address
the problem of drug addiction within drug traﬃcking. This therefore
calls for an urgent recognition of the need to reverting to sentencing
discretion as another measure of pursuing constitutional justice
where drug abusers who push drugs are involved.
Re-introduction of sentencing discretion in sentencing drug abu-
sers who traﬃc in drugs is essential where supportive measures are in
place. Under this approach, at the utmost, presiding oﬃcers would
have to measure all the ﬁve duties against constitutional prescriptions
so as to reach reasonable and fair sentences. In passing a fair and
reasonable sentence courts would be informed of the objectives of the
constitution with regard to sentencing and would consequently need
to move away from the strict measures per the Zinn106 standards.
Courts will engage in a diﬃcult and complex exercise of discretion in
reaching a sentence that is constant, harsh and suitable for the crime
of drug traﬃcking. To some extent this scenario requires a sort of a
biased kind of justice as far as Zinn107 standards are concerned.
Presiding oﬃcers would therefore be forced to put more emphasis on
the rehabilitation of individuals as opposed to the rest of the three
requirements. As courts have to consider the health status of the
accused and the need to rehabilitate the unhealthy convict who never
had intention to sell drugs but for addiction, they would refrain from
harsh punishments even though suitable for drug traﬃckers. Courts
would be forced to adopt a constitutionally cautious approach which
would demand avoidance of a position that calls for a strict appli-
cation of all the required Zinn108 standards simultaneously.
In situations implicating addicted drug pushers courts have to turn
their heads and consider mitigating circumstances more than aggra-
vating circumstances. The main reason for that is their concern to
sentences that address the needs for the punishment of individual
drug addicts before courts. In most circumstances the courts would
have come to a conclusion that the oﬀenders were involved in traf-
ﬁcking due to some signiﬁcant coercion and inducement such as the
inﬂuence of their masters on oﬀenders with a signiﬁcant lack of
capacity for judgment due to having consumed drugs. Another factor
106 S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537.
107 Above n 99.
108 Ibid.
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that might have motivated the commission of the crime would have
been the severe need for a consistent supply of drugs.
Further, courts are bound to ask subjective questions pertaining to
whether the accused before court could have committed the oﬀence of
drug traﬃcking if he was not under the inﬂuence of drugs. Normally,
drug pushers of this nature would be found to be victims of human
traﬃcking who are simultaneously forced through the consumption
of drugs to act as drug mules. Such cases portray diﬀerent scenarios
which mandate unique and independent decisions rendering any law
that intends to classify them as similar, unreasonable and unfair. It
would even be worse to compare these cases to purely drug traﬃcking
cases.
At most there is a general need to re-educate the legal profession
on aspect of drug abuse and law because there is a thin line between
law and health issues in this regard. Drastic changes needs to be made
in the criminal justice system for recalcitrant drug abusers who break
the law. There is a need for South Africa to consider the creation of
drug treatment courts which would be more specialised and eﬀective
than the current approach.
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